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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of three likely factors in driving the steady 
deterioration of the US external balance: US technology developments, changes in the 
US government fiscal position and the Fed’s monetary policy. Estimating several 
Vector Autoregressions on US data over the period 1982:2 to 2005:4 we identify five 
structural shocks: a multi-factor productivity shock; an investment-specific 
technology shock; a monetary policy shock; and a fiscal revenue and spending shock. 
Together these shocks can account for the deterioration and subsequent reversal of the 
trade balance in the 1980s. Productivity improvements and fiscal and monetary policy 
easing also play an important role in the increase of the external deficit since 2000, 
but these structural shocks can not explain why the trade balance deteriorated in the 
second half of the 1990s.   
 










JEL codes: F3; F4 
4
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 719
January 2007 
Non-technical summary 
Since the early 1990s the US current account and net trade deficit have steadily 
deteriorated from close to balance to a deficit of more than 5 percent in 2004 and 
2005. As a counterpart, various regions have developed large surpluses vis-à-vis the 
United States. The emergence of those global current account imbalances has 
generated a large literature investigating the sources of the imbalances, their 
sustainability and the likely adjustment mechanism including the role of the exchange 
rate in this adjustment and the implications of the adjustment process for global 
growth and financial markets. Clearly, both the sustainability and the features of the 
adjustment mechanism depend very much on the sources behind the emergence of the 
imbalances. A number of authors have focused on developments in the US economy, 
in particular the productivity boom starting in the second half of the 1990s, but also 
developments in fiscal and monetary policy in particular since the start of the new 
millennium. Others have emphasized excess savings in Asian countries pointing out 
that following the Asian crisis in 1997 savings rates in many Asian countries 
remained relatively high in spite of falling investment rates. Still others have 
highlighted the efforts of some Asian monetary authorities to resist an appreciation of 
their respective currencies and to accumulate large quantities of foreign reserves. 
Finally, more recently the recycling of the increased oil revenues by oil-producing 
countries has been pointed out as a major factor.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the role of domestic US factors. The main reason for doing 
so is that the secular deterioration of the net trade balance has occurred relative to 
most of the major regions in the world. This suggests that some of the main sources 
are likely to lie in developments in the United States itself. The paper investigates the 
role of three likely factors: US productivity developments and the new-economy 
boom, changes in the fiscal position of the US government and the Fed’s monetary 
policy. For that purpose we estimate Vector Autoregressions (VARs) on US data over 
the period from 1982 to 2005 and identify various structural shocks: multi-factor 
productivity shocks; investment-specific or embodied technology shocks, monetary 
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the trade balance can be explained by those shocks. We find that each of the structural 
shocks have an economically and often statistically significant impact on the trade 
balance more or less in line with a priori reasoning: Positive technology shocks and 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy developments lead to a deterioration of the 
trade balance. Together the shocks explain the deterioration of the trade balance in the 
early 1980s and its subsequent return to balance in the second half of the 1980s. They 
also explain the deterioration of the trade balance in the new millennium. Both 
positive technology developments and fiscal and monetary policy easing following 
the collapse of the dot-com bubble play an important role in the rapid deterioration 
since 2000. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated technology shocks can not account 
for the increase in the trade deficit in the second half of the 1990s.  
6
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policy shocks and fiscal revenue and expenditure shocks. We analyze the effects of 
those shocks on the current account and investigate how much of the developments in  
1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s the US current account and net trade deficit have steadily 
deteriorated from close to balance to a deficit of more than 5 percent in 2004 and 
2005 (see Figure 1). As a counterpart, a number of countries/regions have developed 
large surpluses vis-à-vis the United States (Figure 2). The emergence of those global 
current account imbalances has generated a large literature investigating the sources 
of the imbalances, their sustainability and the likely adjustment mechanism including 
the role of the exchange rate in this adjustment and the implications of the adjustment 
process for global growth and financial markets.
1 Clearly, both the sustainability and 
the features of the adjustment mechanism depend very much on the sources behind 
the emergence of the imbalances. A number of authors have focused on developments 
in the US economy, in particular the productivity boom starting in the second half of 
the 1990s, but also developments in fiscal and monetary policy in particular since the 
start of the new millennium.
2 Others have emphasized excess savings in Asian 
countries pointing out that following the Asian crisis in 1997 savings rates in many 
Asian countries remained relatively high in spite of falling investment rates.
3 Still 
others have highlighted the efforts of some Asian monetary authorities to resist an 
appreciation of their respective currencies and to accumulate large quantities of 
foreign reserves.
4 Finally, more recently the recycling of the increased oil revenues by 
oil-producing countries has been pointed out as a major factor (e.g. WEO, 2006).
5  
 
{Insert Figure 1} 
 
In this paper, we focus on the role of domestic US factors. The main reason for doing 
so is that, as illustrated in Table 1, the secular deterioration of the net trade balance 
has occurred relative to most of the major regions in the world. This suggests that 
some of the main sources are likely to lie in developments in the United States itself.  
                                                 
1  For a recent more academic survey see Corsetti (2005). Policy surveys are Gros, Mayer and Ubide 
(2006), WEO (2005), BIS (2004). 
2  Examples are Engel and Rogers (2006), Backus et al (2006), Roubini and Setzer (2005). 
3  See, for example, Bernanke (2005), Caballero, Gourinchas and Fahri (2005), WEO (2005). 
4  See, for example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005). 
5  In addition, there is a quite lively literature on measurement issues ranging from papers that argue the 
US is not a deficit country (Hausmann and Sturzenegger 2005) to papers that argue that the problem 
may be even more serious than suggested by conventional measurement (Gros et al, 2006). 
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{Insert Table 1} 
 
The paper investigates the role of three likely factors: US productivity developments 
and the new-economy boom, changes in the fiscal position of the US government and 
the Fed’s monetary policy. For that purpose we estimate Vector Autoregressions 
(VARs) on US data and identify various structural shocks: a multi-factor productivity 
shock; an investment-specific or embodied technology shock, a monetary policy 
shock and a fiscal revenue and expenditure shock. In Section 2, we analyze the effects 
of those shocks separately following and extending an extensive academic literature 
that uses VARs to investigate the role of those shocks in US business cycles. In 
Section 2.1, we identify the technology shocks using long-run zero restrictions on 
labour productivity and the relative price of investment equipment respectively 
following Gali (1999) and Fischer (2006). Section 2.2 focuses on the role of fiscal 
policy and following Perotti (2005) uses contemporaneous zero restrictions to identify 
both government spending and revenue shocks. Finally, Section 2.3 analyses the role 
of monetary policy shocks as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Kim 
(2001).  
 
As argued in Altig et al (2005), a number of those shocks can account for a large 
fraction of business cycle fluctuations in the United States. It is therefore interesting 
to see how much of the developments in the trade balance can be explained by those 
shocks. An important caveat to this US-focused approach is that only asymmetric 
shocks are likely to affect current account and trade balances (Glick and Rogoff, 
1995). Ignoring the international comovement and transmission of the US shocks as 
well as the incidence of foreign shocks may bias our results. However, the direction of 
this bias is not clear. To the extent that the identified shocks are common across 
countries, the estimated effects on the trade balance are likely to be underestimated. In 
contrast, if domestic and foreign shocks are negatively correlated, the estimated 
effects may be overestimated.
6  
 
                                                 
6  In the case of productivity shocks, we have investigated the effect of identifying relative productivity 
shocks on the basis of relative labour productivity movements in the US versus the G7 countries. In 
this case, our estimates were not significantly affected.   
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Notwithstanding these caveats, we find that each of the structural shocks have an 
economically and often statistically significant impact on the trade balance more or 
less in line with a priori reasoning: Positive technology shocks and expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy developments lead to a deterioration of the trade balance. 
Together the shocks explain the deterioration of the trade balance in the early 1980s 
and its subsequent return to balance in the second half of the 1980s. They also explain 
the deterioration of the trade balance in the new millennium. Both positive technology 
developments and fiscal and monetary policy easing following the collapse of the dot-
com bubble play an important role in the rapid deterioration since 2000. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the estimated technology shocks can not account for the increase in the 
trade deficit in the second half of the 1990s.  
 
2. The impact of technology and policy shocks on the 
US trade balance: VAR evidence 
 
In this section we discuss each of the three possible factors (technology, fiscal policy 
and monetary policy) in turn. In each case, we examine the related VAR literature that 
has tried to identify those shocks and analyze their effects on the trade balance. In 
each of these sections, the empirical strategy is to first replicate a key VAR study in 
the literature and to then extend the analysis by extending the sample to 2005:4 and 
including the net trade/GDP ratio. For space reasons, in what follows, we only report 
the findings from the final VAR.
7 
 
In order to estimate the effects of the various shocks, we use a common data sample 
starting in the early 1980s (1982:2-2005:4 to be precise). There are various reasons 
for restricting the analysis to the last two decades or so. First, given our interest in 
understanding the US trade balance, it is important to focus on a period when the 
international markets in goods, services and financial assets were more or less 
liberalized. The 1980s was a period of general liberalization of international capital 
movements in many regions of the world making the external financing of domestic 
saving and investment imbalances easier. Second, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) 
have argued that there has been a change in the conduct of monetary policy associated 
                                                 
7  All quarterly VARs estimated in this paper contain four lags of the endogenous variables. 
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with the appointment of Paul Volker to the Federal Reserve. Gali, Lopez-Salido and 
Valles (2003) present evidence that the change in policy regime has also led to a 
change in the effects of neutral technology shocks on the US economy, while Boivin 
and Giannoni (2005) argue that it has also impacted the effects of monetary policy. 
Also Perotti (2005) and Fisher (2006) document pre-and-post-1982 sample 
differences in the effects of fiscal policy and technology shocks respectively. Third, a 
large literature starting with McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) has documented a 
substantial decline in the volatility of many macro-economic variables after 1984. The 
sources of this “great moderation” are still unclear.
8 Alternative hypothesis are 
changes in inventories, better stabilization policies and increased financial deepening 
and integration leading to a relaxation of credit constraints. Fourth, Fisher (2006) 
finds a structural break in the mean rate of decline in the baseline equipment deflator 
around 1982 (0.84% versus 1.49% after 1982). He relates this to the time when the 
personal computer began to be widely used in business. For all these reasons, we will 
focus on the period 1982:2 – 2005:4 in the rest of the analysis. 
 
2.1. Technology 
The new economy boom of the 1990s and the increase in expected productivity 
growth in the United States is one of the most-often cited factors that are used to 
explain the deterioration of the current account since the 1990s. For example, Hunt 
and Rebucci (2005) argue that a persistent increase in productivity in the 
manufacturing/traded-goods sector associated with some learning can explain about 
one third of the deterioration of the US trade balance over the period 1996-2000. In 
this story foreign borrowing allows US households to consume part of their future 
wealth and firms to invest in order to make use of new profitable technologies. It is 
indeed a well-documented fact that over the past 15 years total factor productivity 
growth in the US has increased relative to the rest of the G7 countries and the world 
more generally. For example, recent estimates from the OECD show that US multi 
factor productivity grew by almost 2 percent per year over the 1998-2004 period and 
1 percentage point higher than during 1991-1997. In contrast, the other G7 countries 
in general saw their productivity growth rates fall. At the same time, investment rates 
                                                 
8  See, for example, Stock and Watson (2005) for a recent investigation. 
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boomed in the second half of the 1990s, suggesting that some of the new technologies 
may have been embedded in new capital goods.  
 
In this section, we therefore aim at identifying two kinds of technology shocks 
(neutral - or multi-factor – and embodied technology shocks). There has been a lively 
debate about the role of productivity shocks in accounting for business cycle 
fluctuations in the United States. A number of authors (most prominently Galí (1999), 
Francis and Ramey (2005) and Galí and Rabanal (2004)) have argued that total factor 
productivity shocks can not account for a large fraction of US business cycles because 
they lead to a negative correlation between output and hours worked in the face of 
nominal rigidities, habit formation and adjustment costs in investment (See also Smets 
and Wouters, forthcoming). Others such as Altig et al (2005) and Dedola and Neri 
(2005) have argued that the empirical evidence on the effect of productivity on hours 
worked could be consistent with a positive impact. Fisher (2006) argues that 
investment-specific productivity shocks or embodied technology shocks can account 
for a much larger fraction of business cycle fluctuations than neutral technology 
shocks. Together they account for about 40 to 60 % of business cycle fluctuations, of 
which embodied technology shocks account for the most part. Altig et al (2005), 
using a different methodology, also argue that both productivity shocks can account 
for a large fraction of GDP fluctuations. 
  
In this Section we estimate Fisher’s (2006) VAR over the period 1982:2 – 2005:4 and 
add the net trade/GDP ratio in order to estimate the effects of total factor productivity 
and embodied technology shocks on net trade. As in Fisher (2006), the six-variable 
VAR reported in this section includes the log change in the relative price of 
equipment,
9 the log change in labour productivity in the non-farm business, the 
associated log per-capita hours worked, the log change in the GDP deflator and the 
federal funds rate.
10 In addition, we add the change in the net trade/GDP ratio
11. The 
two technology shocks are identified using long-run restrictions. In particular, the 
embodied technology shock is the only shock that has a long-run impact on the 
                                                 
9 We thank Riccardo Di Cecio and Reinout de Boeck for providing us with this series until 2004:4. We 
extended it further using the NIPA deflators. 
10  Fischer (2006) uses the same five-variable VAR for the sub-sample analysis, although in his 
specification a consumption deflator built by him replaces the GDP deflator in our analysis. 
11 Using a battery of conventional unit root tests, we could not reject nonstationarity of this variable 
over the sample period. 
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relative price of equipment. Moreover, the embodied and neutral (or multi-factor) 
productivity shocks are the only shocks that have a long-run impact on labour 
productivity. Finally, using a stylized growth model Fischer (2006) shows that the 
long-run impact of the embodied technology shock on labour productivity is related to 
the share of capital in production and uses this restriction as an over-identifying 
restriction.
12 
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farm business sector, and Xt is an additional vector of variables included in the VAR. 
In all of our applications we assume that the number of lags q = 4. Suppose that the 
fundamental economic shocks are related to the one-step ahead forecast error ut via 
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The 0’s reflect the assumption that only the embodied technology shock has a non-
zero long-run impact on the relative price of equipment rp1 and only the embodied and 
neutral productivity shocks have non-zero long-run impacts rz1 and rz2 on labour 
productivity. Although we cannot directly estimate R, we can easily estimate RR’: 
() [] () []
1 1 ' 1 ' 1 '
− − − − ≡ B I CC B I RR , 
                                                 
12 We find that in the extended sample, this restriction is rejected in the 6-variable VAR. Nevertheless, 
we still report the results obtained imposing it since they are very similar to those in the benchmark 
specification of Section 3, where the restriction is not imposed. 
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since the Bi’s and the variance-covariance matrix Σ =  CC’  can be obtained by 
applying ordinary least squares to the VAR reduced form. Therefore, the first two 
columns of C are obtained from the first two columns of the Choleski decomposition 
of RR’. If Fisher’s over-identifying restriction on the long-run impact of the embodied 
technology shock on labour productivity is also imposed, implying a proportionality 
between rp1 and rz1, the two columns of C will not be simply equal their counterparts 
in the Choleski decomposition, but the fully nonlinear system for RR’ above will need 
to be solved.   
 
{Insert Figure 2} 
 
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of each of the six variables to both shocks.
13 A 
number of similarities and differences between both shocks are worth noting. Both 
increase labour productivity in the long run and lead to a fall in inflation although the 
timing and the dynamics of the effects is quite different. However, the embodied 
shock leads to a tightening of monetary policy, while the neutral shock leads to an 
easing. Moreover, in agreement with the theory, hours worked increase in response to 
the embodied shock, while they fall in response to the neutral shock. Most 
interestingly, both shocks lead to a deterioration of the trade balance. However, the 
impact of the neutral shock is a magnitude larger and more significant than that of the 
embodied shock.
14 A one percent increase in multi-factor productivity leads to an 
estimated deterioration of the net trade/GDP ratio by 0.5 percentage points, whereas a 
similar embodied technology shock has less than half this effect. At first sight, the 
smaller impact of the embodied technology shock on net trade may seem somewhat 
counterintuitive as it has a larger impact on absorption and therefore on imports. 
However, note that partly due to the differential interest rate response the terms-of-
trade deterioration in the case of the neutral shock is likely to be much larger than in 
the case of the embodied technology shock. This price effect will tend to dominate the 
quantity effects on the nominal net trade to GDP ratio. This is indeed exactly what De 
Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005) find in their estimated US-euro area DSGE 
                                                 
13  For clarity, in Figures 2 and 3 we have deleted the confidence bands in order to compare the impulse 
response of two shocks. The significance of the response of the net trade/GDP ratio is similar to that 
reported in Figures 5 and 6.   
14  As also shown in Figure 5, the impact of the embodied technology shock on the nominal net 
trade/GDP ratio is not significant at the 5% confidence level. 
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model. While the investment-specific technology shock has a larger negative effect on 
the real trade balance, the terms-of-trade response is much more favourable and tends 
to dominate in the case of such shocks. De Walque et al (2005) also show that this 
qualitative result is independent of whether a high or low elasticity of substitution is 
assumed. These findings are also partially confirmed in our VAR analysis. 
Substituting the real net trade/GDP ratio for the nominal one, we find that the impact 
of the embodied technology shock on the real net trade/GDP ratio is indeed much 
larger, reflecting the fact that the terms of trade improves following such a shock (not 
shown).    
 
The ability of the technology shocks to explain the developments in the US external 
trade balance will be investigated in Section 3. Here it is, however, useful to compare 
the size of the effects with some of the estimates in the literature. Bussiere et al (2005) 
extend the study by Glick and Rogoff (1995) and find that a one percent asymmetric 
productivity increase (as measured by total factor productivity) leads to a current 
account deterioration of about 0.15 percentage points. Corsetti et al. (2006) look at the 
effects of productivity shocks in manufacturing identified with long-run restrictions, 
finding similar multipliers. Our estimates of the effect of a multi-factor productivity 
shock are clearly larger, although those of the investment specific shock are 
somewhat lower. This underlines the need for distinguishing between the various 
technology shocks when examining their impact on external balances. The role of 
productivity developments in accounting for the deterioration of the current account 
in the late 1990s is also discussed in Hunt and Rebucci (2005) using a calibrated two-
country DSGE model. They conclude that the productivity shock needs to be 
augmented with a negative risk premium shock on US assets in order to be able to 
account for the full deterioration of the US trade deficit in the second half of the 
1990s. 
 
2.2. Fiscal policy 
The twin deficit hypothesis that an increasing government deficit will result in a 
deterioration of the current account balance is hotly debated. Historically, movements 
in the general government surplus and the current account balance have hardly been 
identical twins. While the U.S. trade balance deteriorated throughout the 1990-2005 
14
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period, the general government budget position improved during the 90s and then fell 
sharply after 2000. At the same time, the sharp fall in government revenues and rise in 
government spending in 2001-2003 may have contributed to the accelerating fall of 
the current account balance in that period. Similarly, the deterioration and subsequent 
improvement of the current account in the 1980s may have been associated with the 
rise and subsequent fall in the US government deficit in that period. Several recent 
papers in the literature have re-examined the scope for twin deficits in the US data, 
but no clear conclusions have been reached. For example, Kim and Roubini (2004) 
find that government deficit and spending shocks have a positive effect on the trade 
balance, in contrast to the theoretical literature on the twin deficit hypothesis which 
would generally suggest a negative impact. Corsetti and Muller (2006) show that the 
response of the current account to government spending shocks may depend on the 
persistence of the shock as well as the degree of openness. In more open economies 
and with more persistent shocks, investment will be crowded out less, as the 
associated terms of trade improvement increases the rate of return on investment. As a 
result, the twin deficit hypothesis may be valid for small open economies, but less so 
for relatively closed economies such as the United States. Using a VAR analysis, 
Corsetti and Muller (2006) find some evidence in favor of their analysis. Bussiere et 
al (2005) perform a cross-country analysis of current account imbalances and 
government deficits. They find that a 1 percentage point reduction in the government 
deficit leads to less than a 0.1 percentage point deterioration of the current account. 
This is at the lower end of the multipliers in a number of studies surveyed by Bussiere 
et al (2005). For example, Erceg et al (2005), who use a calibrated modern DSGE 
model, find a multiplier of 0.2. 
 
Most of the literature focuses on government deficit or spending shocks. Theoretically 
however, the effects of a deterioration in the government deficit on the current 
account may be different depending on the source of the deterioration, in particular 
whether it is due to increased government spending or reduced taxes.
15 The 
deterioration of the US government balance in 2001-2003 was mostly due to a fall in 
government revenues following a series of tax reductions. It is therefore of interest to 
look at both government spending and tax shocks.  
                                                 
15  For a recent survey of some of the theoretical literature see Kim and Roubini (2004). 
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In order to assess the effects of fiscal policy, one needs to take into account the other 
shocks to the economy as well as the typical automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy.
 16 
In this section, we follow the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005) 
to estimate the effects of fiscal revenue and spending shocks on the trade balance.
17 
18 
The results that we report are based on Perotti (2005), since this study includes more 
recent years and reports results for samples starting in the early 1980s. However, 
similar findings were obtained by extending Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Apart from 
a different sample period, the only difference with the VAR specification in Perotti 
(2005) is the addition of net trade. Thus, our VAR specification includes 6 variables: 
(i) the log of real per capita government spending on goods and services, including 
government purchases and government investment, (ii) the log of real per capita net 
primary revenues, defined as government revenues less government transfers,
19 (iii) 
the log of real per capita GDP, (iv) the log of GDP deflator, (v) ten year nominal 
interest rate, (vi) ratio of nominal net exports over nominal GDP. For fiscal variables 
and GDP, real values are obtained by deflating nominal values with the GDP deflator. 
Equations in the VAR also include four lags and a constant term. To make results 
directly comparable with the large-scale VAR results from the next section, all the 
variables, except the 10 year nominal interest rate, are expressed in log first 
differences. 
 
Government spending and revenue shocks are identified using contemporaneous zero 
restrictions. In the VAR government spending (G) and net taxes (T) are ordered first 
and second, followed by real GDP, GDP deflator and the 10 year nominal interest 
rate. Net trade is added to the VAR by ordering it last; namely Yt is defined as: 
                                                 
16  For an alternative story about the role of government debt policy in driving current account 
17  A related study is Mountford and Uhlig (2005), who use sign restrictions rather than 
contemporaneous restrictions to identify fiscal policy shocks. 
18 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) also report separate responses of exports and imports to the fiscal 
shocks, although it is not the main focus of the paper. 
19 For exact definition of both fiscal series see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Mountford and Uhlig 
(2005). Spending and tax series from Perotti (2005) would be preferred here, but are not publicly 
available. These series should not be very different from the ones used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
and Mountford and Uhlig (2005). 
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where  Xt includes the growth rates of real GDP and GDP deflator, the 10 year 
nominal interest rate net trade over GDP . Remembering that the fundamental 
economic shocks are related to the one-step ahead forecast error ut via the 
relationship: 
Σ = = = ' , ' , CC I e Ee Ce u t t t t , 
the two fiscal shocks of interest, ordered first and second in et, are identified directly 
restricting the (inverse of) matrix C, depicting how reduced form residuals map into 
structural shocks. In order to be able to recover the first two columns of C, we need 
N-1 + N-2 = 9 restrictions. We obtain them by positing reaction functions for the two 
fiscal variables, following Perotti (2005). First, we assume that expenditure does not 
contemporaneously react to revenues, and then is ordered first in the VAR.
20 Second, 
the contemporaneous responses of government spending and revenues to GDP and 
prices are set on a priori basis. For our sample of interest (1982:2-2005:4) we apply 
the elasticities that Perotti (2005) reports for the 1980Q1-2001Q4 period (see Table 4 
in Perotti (2005), n[gy]=0; n[ty]=1.97; n[gp]=-0.5; n[tp]=1.4; n[gi]=0; n[ti]=0). 
Finally, the last two restrictions needed are obtained by assuming that similar 
elasticities concerning the trade balance are zero.  
 
{Insert Figure 3} 
 
Figure 3 shows the response of each of the variables to the government spending and 
net revenue shock. A few results are worth highlighting. First, a one-standard 
deviation positive government spending shock increases output in the short run by 
about 0.1 to 0.2%. This effect is marginally significant. In contrast, a reduction in 
taxes does not appear to have a significant impact on output, and if anything leads to a 
fall in output. While in particular the latter result is quite surprising, it is consistent 
with the results of Perotti (2005), who finds that the output effects of government 
spending are typically larger than those of a comparable change in revenues in five 
OECD countries (including the US). Perotti (2005) also finds that in general the 
                                                 
20 This is the benchmark specification in Perotti (2005). As in this contribution, our results are broadly 
similar when we invert the ordering of spending and revenues. 
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output effects of a government spending shock have fallen significantly since the 
early 1980s. Second, both an increase in spending and a tax cut have a negative effect 
on the net trade/GDP ratio. In the case of a positive spending shock, we observe an 
immediate significant negative impact on the external balance. The associated 
multiplier is in the order of 0.30 to 0.40 and thus somewhat higher than the one found 
in Bussiere et al. (2005). For a tax shock the negative impact on net trade takes longer 
to materialise and is also less significant. In this case the multiplier ranges from 0.01 
for immediate impact to 0.30 for impact after 12 quarters.
21   
 
In sum, overall we find a significant role of the deterioration of fiscal balances for the 
deterioration of the net trade balance. The quantitative relevance of fiscal policy 
shocks for the most recent deterioration of the current account will be examined in 
Section 3. 
 
2.3. Monetary policy 
 
Finally, we investigate the role of monetary policy in the developments of the current 
account. One popular story is that loose monetary policy following the collapse of the 
dot-com asset price bubble, the resulting recession and fears of deflation has led to 
low short and long-term interest rates and rising house prices.
22 This in turn has 
stimulated domestic demand leading to a rise in imports and a deterioration of the 
terms of trade, both contributing to a rise in the nominal trade balance deficit. Indeed, 
as inflation has declined since the early 1980s, also nominal short and long-term 
interest rates have fallen considerably over the last two decades. More importantly, 
real short-term interest rates have been significantly negative in the period 2001-2004.  
 
However, in order to asses whether monetary policy has been exceptionally loose, one 
needs to control for the normal policy response to changes in inflation and real 
economic activity. This is exactly what the large VAR literature on estimating the 
                                                 
21 To obtain fiscal multiplier, the shock was expressed as a percentage point change in government 
spending/GDP (net revenue/GDP) by multiplying the shock with average spending/GDP (net 
revenue/GDP) ratio. For our sample period, average shares are 0.19 for spending/GDP and 0.14 for net 
revenues/GDP. 
22  See, for example, Gros, Mayer and Ubide (2006). 
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effects of monetary policy on the US economy has tried to do.
23 In this section, we 
follow the recent work by Kim (2001), who builds on this literature to analyse the 
effects of US monetary policy shocks on the trade balance and other international 
variables. More specifically, Kim (2001) estimates a small-scale VAR in real GDP, 
the GDP deflator, the federal funds rate and a commodity price index over the period 
1974-1996. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), he identifies 
monetary policy shocks by assuming that they have no contemporaneous effects on 
output, inflation and commodity prices. Commodity prices are included to alleviate 
the so-called price puzzle, the common finding that prices rise for a while following 
an unexpected interest rate increase. A similar VAR is used by Boivin and Giannoni 
(2005) to investigate whether monetary policy has become more effective in the post-
1982 period. Using this VAR, Kim (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) show that 
a rise in the federal funds rate leads to a hump-shaped fall in output and a much more 
gradual decline in prices. Kim (2001) then investigates the effects of a US monetary 
policy shock on the trade balance and foreign output. He finds that an expansionary 
monetary policy shock worsens the US real trade balance in about a year and leads to 
a terms-of-trade deterioration as the dollar exchange rate depreciates. Overall, this 
contributes to a significant deterioration of the nominal trade balance in the short to 
medium-run.  
In analogy with the previous sections, we update the findings of Kim (2001) by 
estimating a similar VAR and using a similar identification strategy over the sample 
period 1982:2 till 2005:4. Apart from the different sample period, there are two main 
differences in the specification of the VAR. First, we leave out the commodity price 
index, as over this sample the inclusion of commodity prices did not improve the 
estimated effects of the policy shock very much (either in terms of sharpening the 
confidence bands or alleviating the price puzzle). Second, we introduce real GDP and 
the GDP deflator in log first differences (rather than in log levels) anticipating the 
specification of the large-scale VAR in the next Section. Neither of these changes has 
a material impact on the estimated impulse responses. Finally, as with the other VARs 
discussed in this Section, the net trade/GDP ratio (NX) is introduced in first 
differences and it is assumed that the monetary policy shock can have an immediate 
                                                 
23  One of the classic references is Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999). 
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impact on net trade/GDP ratio, but that policy does not immediately respond to 





















where Xt includes the growth rates of real GDP and GDP deflator, and it is the federal 
fund rate. As before, in order to recover the monetary policy shock we need to 
appropriately restrict matrix C in order to be able to recover its third column, 
describing the effect of a monetary policy shock on the VAR variables. Following 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Kim (2001), without loss of generality 
we assume that C has a recursive structure, so that the column of interest can be 
recovered from the third column of the Choleski factor ofΣ. The monetary policy 
shock is then effectively identified as the residual from a regression of the policy 
instrument it over contemporaneous and lagged values of Xt and only lagged values of 
net trade and itself, controlling this way for the normal policy response to changes in 
inflation and real economic activity. This means that systematic monetary policy is 
assumed to react within the same quarter to observed values of GDP growth and 
inflation; for instance, increases in the nominal rate which only reflect increases in 
current and past inflation will not be attributed to exogenous changes in the monetary 
policy stance.  
 
{Insert Figure 4}   
 
Figure 4 shows the estimated impulse responses of the federal funds rate, the GDP 
deflator, real GDP and the net trade/GDP ratio to a monetary policy shock over the 
recent sample. The results confirm the findings of Kim (2001) and Boivin and 
Giannoni (2005): An unexpected temporary tightening of the federal funds rate by 50 
basis points leads to a hump-shaped decline in real GDP of maximally 30 to 40 basis 
points and a very gradual (but not significant) decline in the GDP deflator. More 
importantly for our purposes, the nominal net trade/GDP ratio improves significantly 
in the second year following the shock. According to these estimates, a 50 basis point 
policy easing leads to a maximum deterioration of the net trade/GDP ratio of 0.2 
percentage points after two years. These multipliers are both statistically and 
economically significant and appear to be quite robust with respect to adding 
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additional variables. It will therefore be interesting to see how much the monetary 
policy easing of the early millennium can contribute to the deterioration of the trade 
balance during that period. This will be discussed in the next section.
24    
       
3. The contribution of technology and policy to US 
current account developments 
 
In the previous section, we analyzed the effects of technology and policy shocks on 
the trade balance in separate VARs by following and extending the existing VAR 
literature. This allowed us to keep the size of the VARs relatively small, which is 
important given the relatively limited sample size. However, in order to assess the 
relative contributions of technology versus policy shocks in driving external trade and 
current account developments, it is crucial to put the various shocks into one VAR. 
This is what we do in this Section. In order to maintain enough degrees of freedom, 
we restrict the number of variables in the VAR to eight and the number of identified 
shocks to four. First, the price of equipment is included in order to identify the 
embodied technology shock. Second, we use non-farm business sector labour 
productivity to identify the multi-factor productivity shock. As before, both 
technology shocks are identified using long-run restrictions. Third, in line with the 
twin-deficit hypothesis we combine the government spending and revenue shock into 
one government deficit shock by constructing an adjusted government deficit measure 
which takes into account the short-run automatic multipliers of the deficit with respect 
to output and inflation. Fourth, monetary policy developments are captured by the 
federal funds rate. As before, both policy shocks are identified using short-run 
restrictions. In addition to the four variables that are necessary to identify the four 
shocks, we add real private consumption and real private investment (which together 
form domestic private absorption), the change in the GDP deflator and the net 
external trade/GDP ratio. More details regarding the identification scheme are given 
in the appendix.   
 
                                                 
24  Adding financial variables to the VAR, we also found that the long-term rate does significantly rise 
in response to the monetary policy tightening. The effect of a 50 basis point increase is to raise the 10-
year bond yield temporarily by 10 basis points. Moreover, the policy tightening also leads to a fall in 
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{Insert Figure 5} 
 
Figure 5 reports the impulse responses of the nominal net trade/GDP ratio to each of 
the four identified shocks (together with two standard deviation confidence bands) in 
two versions of the 8-variable VAR. The upper panel is based on a VAR that includes 
a drift term (or constant) in the equation for the change in the net trade/GDP ratio. 
This drift term captures the secular fall in the net trade/GDP ratio over the sample 
period by about 0.20 percentage points per year. As the constant is not significantly 
different from zero, we also report the results of a similar VAR without such a drift 
term in the lower panel of Figure 5. Such a VAR allows us to investigate to what 
extent the four structural shocks can contribute to the secular fall in the net trade/GDP 
ratio over the full sample. It is easy to verify that in both cases the overall effects of 
the four structural shocks on net trade are very similar to what we found in the more 
specialized VARs discussed in Section 2. This shows that the estimated effects are 
quite robust with respect to the choice of variables that are included in the VAR. As 
before, it turns out that a one-standard deviation multi-factor productivity and 
monetary policy shock have the largest and most significant effect on the net 
trade/GDP ratio.  
 
{Insert Table 2} 
 
How much of the swings in the US external trade balance over the past two decades 
can the four structural shocks account for? Table 2 gives the contribution of each of 
the shocks to the forecast error variance of changes in the net trade/GDP ratio at 
various horizons. It turns out that the fiscal, monetary policy and technology shocks 
each explain between 8 and 12 percent of the forecast variance at business cycle 
frequencies. Figure 6 plots the actual net trade/GDP ratio as well as the joint 
contribution of the four shocks and the baseline over the full sample period in the 
VARs with and without a drift term in net trade. This figure also plots the contribution 
of the four shocks to the growth of domestic absorption, the inflation rate and the 
federal funds rate. Comparing the contribution to net trade in both VARs (Figure 6), it 
is clear that the VAR with a drift term is better able to account for the secular fall in 
net trade over the sample period. However, it is also clear that the main failure of the 
VAR without a drift term to account for this trend is located in the 1990s. In fact, it is 
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worth distinguishing three episodes, which are analysed in more detail in Figures 7a 
and 7b. The first episode covers the 1980s. In this period, the four structural shocks 
are able to explain the drop in the net trade balance in the early 1980s and the 
subsequent increase in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. 
Looking at the contribution of the shocks separately (Figure 7a,b), it appears that 
technology developments and to a lesser extent a reversal of loose fiscal policy have 
contributed to a return of the net trade deficit to almost balance. The second episode 
covers most of the 1990s. In contrast to the 1980s, the structural shocks can not 
explain the large deterioration of the net trade balance in the 1990s (in particular the 
three percentage point deterioration since 1997). It is interesting to see that in this 
period, both inflation and the nominal interest rate are overpredicted. Moreover, the 
structural shocks can not explain the investment boom associated with the dot-com 
bubble in the late 1990s either, the period with the most rapid deterioration of net 
trade in the United States. As discussed in the introduction, a number of other not 
necessarily US driven developments have been proposed to explain the growing 
imbalances. Three of those are worth mentioning. First, following the Asian crisis in 
1997-1998, a number of Asian countries such as Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia experienced a sharp and persistent drop in investment rates, coupled with 
temporarily high savings rates. These developments coincided with a build up of 
official reserves as of 1999. These changes coincide with the emergence of a large 
gap between actual net trade developments in the US and the part explained by our 
US shocks (see Figure 7) and therefore may explain part of this gap. Second, the rapid 
accumulation of reserves in China following strong growth in exports under its 
mercantilist policy only took off in 2001 and therefore is unlikely to explain what 
happened in the second subperiod. Finally, most recently more emphasis has been put 
on the recycling of petrodollars as a factor behind the growing global imbalances. 
However, also this factor only became relevant after 1999, suggesting that it can not 
explain the gap in Figure 7 in the 1997-2000 period. 
 
{Insert Figure 6} 
{Insert Figure 7} 
 
Finally, turning to the most recent period since 2000, it turns out that the three types 
of shocks have all contributed to the further deterioration of the net trade/GDP ratio. 
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Depending on the VAR specification, positive technology developments, easy fiscal 
policy and loose monetary policy have each lead to an increase of the trade deficit by 




In this paper we have examined the relative role of technology and policy in the 
deterioration of the US net trade/GDP ratio since the second half of the 1990s. 
Understanding the sources behind the rise of the US external deficit is crucial for 
understanding whether the large deficit is sustainable and what policy measures are 
needed to ensure an orderly adjustment process. Using identified VARs estimated 
over the 1982:2-2005:4 period, we found that since the start of the new millennium 
both positive technology developments and easy fiscal and monetary policy in the US 
have played a role. The part due to technological progress should be less of a concern 
to the extent that higher future growth is likely to increase savings rates in the future. 
However, after playing a stabilizing role in the second half of the 1990s, both 
monetary and in particular fiscal policy turned very loose at the beginning of the 
millennium and also contributed considerably to the deterioration of the trade balance. 
As those policies are normalized, they could contribute to an improvement of the 
external balance of around 2 percentage points. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated 
structural shocks can, however, not explain the significant deterioration in the late 
1990s. One possibility is that our identification scheme fails to capture the impact of 
embodied technological progress in this period. Another possibility is that other 
factors such as the Asian crisis and its impact on excess global savings are important 
determinants in this period. An extension of the VAR methodology to account for 
such shocks would be a useful area for future research.  
 
Of course, the analysis can be further extended and improved in a number of ways. 
First, the robustness of the results reported in this paper need to be further checked, 
for example by using alternative identification schemes. Second, we need to 
investigate more closely what are the channels through which the identified shocks 
affect the overall trade balance. In particular, it would be important to understand the 
role of the exchange rate and the terms of trade adjustments in response to the various 
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shocks. We also need to analyze to what extent the estimated effects are consistent 
with modern intertemporal open-economy macro models in order to increase our 
confidence in the estimated effects.  
 
Appendix: The identification scheme of the VAR 
estimated in Section 3 
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First, the price of equipment pt is included in order to identify the embodied 
technology shock. Second, we use non-farm business sector labour productivity zt to 
identify the multi-factor productivity shock. Third, in line with the twin-deficit 
hypothesis we combine the government spending and revenue shock into one 
government deficit shock by constructing an adjusted government deficit measure 
which takes into account the short-run automatic multipliers of the deficit with respect 
to output and inflation, BDt. Fourth, monetary policy developments are captured by 
the federal funds rate it. In addition to the four variables that are necessary to identify 
the four shocks, we include in vector Xt the growth rate of real private consumption 
and real private investment (which together form domestic private absorption) and the 
change in the GDP deflator, and finally the net external trade/GDP ratio. 
As before, both technology shocks are identified using long-run restrictions, while 
both policy shocks are identified using short-run restrictions. Concretely, we proceed 
in the following way. First, in order to identify the two technology shocks we estimate 
the corresponding two columns of the C matrix by a straightforward generalization of 
the procedure described in Section 2.1. The two long-run restrictions imply that the 
long-run responses of the above system satisfy: 
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where now Z denotes the vector including the non-technology variables in the VAR, 
namely ∆BDt, Xt, it, and ∆NXt. As before, the 0’s reflect the assumption that only the 
embodied technology shock has a long-run impact on the relative price of equipment 
and only the embodied and neutral productivity shocks have a long-run impact on 
labour productivity. Again this structure of P implies that the two columns of interest 
of C can be retrieved from the first two columns of the Choleski decomposition of 
PP’: 
() [] () []
1 1 ' 1 ' 1 '
− − − − ≡ ΡΡ B I CC B I . 
Notice that differently from Section 2.1 in this case we do not impose Fisher (2006) 
over-identifying restriction as it is rejected by the data. 
Second, in order to identify the policy shocks we assume again a recursive structure 
for the remaining columns of C,  according to which the (adjusted) budget deficit 
responds contemporaneously only to both technological variables, while the federal 
fund rate responds also to all the variables included in Xt. It can be shown that these 
assumptions, plus knowledge of the two columns of C obtained with long-run 
restrictions, yields enough restrictions (namely N(N-1)/2) to exactly solve the matrix 
equation Σ = CC’ and thus estimate the effects of the two policy shocks (see e.g. Altig 
et al. (2005)). 
 It is important to notice that relative to Section 2.2 we are allowing fiscal variables to 
contemporaneously react to technology shocks beyond what would be implied by 
Perotti (2005) multipliers on prices and GDP. However, we do not impose these 
further over-identifying restrictions, as they are rejected by the data, and thus keep 
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Table 2: Contribution of the four shocks to the variance of changes in net trade/GDP 
   
 (a) 8 variable VAR with drift term         
          Forecast variance at indicated horizon   
Type of shock  1 4 8  12  20 
Fiscal  policy  4.9 9.8 8.3 8.3 8.3 
Embodied  technology  4.0 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.2 
Neutral  technology  1.4 5.2 6.5 7.3 7.2 
Monetary  policy  4.1  9.8  10.1 10.0 10.0 
       
(b) 8 variable VAR without  drift  term      
          Forecast variance at indicated horizon   
Type of shock  1 4 8  12  20 
Fiscal  policy  6.3  10.4  9.0 8.9 8.9 
Embodied  technology  2.9 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.6 
Neutral  technology  0.0 4.2 5.4 6.0 5.9 
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Contribution of structural shocks to net trade, absorption, inflation and interest rate 
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Figure 7a: Contribution of structural shocks to the net trade/GDP ratio: 3 episodes  
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Figure 7b: Contribution of structural shocks to the net trade/GDP ratio: 3 episodes  
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